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The question of direct or "naïve" realism, as opposed to indirect or "representational" realism, arises in the philosophy of perception and of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience;〔Lehar, Steve. (2000). (The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior ), ''Consciousness and Cognition''.〕〔Lehar, Steve. (2000). (Naïve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy ), ''The Function of Conscious Experience''.〕 the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain. Naïve realism is known as ''direct'' realism when developed to counter ''indirect'' or representative realism, also known as epistemological dualism,〔Lehar, Steve. (Representationalism )〕 the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world. Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the accepted view of perception in natural science that states that we do not and cannot perceive the external world as it really is but know only our ideas and interpretations of the way the world is.〔Hearing (or audition) is the ability to perceive (create ideas of)sound by detecting vibrations. The sound waves of language cannot perceive directly. They are only heard, interpreted and understood because the physical waves were transformed into ideas (Mental representation of sound wages) by our brains.〕 Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of cognitivism in psychology. The representational realist would deny that 'first-hand knowledge' is a coherent concept, since knowledge is always via some means. Our ideas of the world are interpretations of sensory input derived from an external world that is real (unlike the standpoint of idealism). The alternative, that we have knowledge of the outside world that is unconstrained by our sense organs and does not require interpretation, would appear to be inconsistent with everyday observation. ==History== Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In ''On the Soul'' he describes how a seer is informed of the object itself by way of the hylomorphic form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed. Indirect realism was popular with early modern philosophers such as René Descartes and John Locke. Locke categorized qualities as follows:〔A. D. Smith, ‘On Primary and Secondary Qualities’, Philosophical Review (1990), 221-54〕 * Primary qualities are qualities which are 'explanatorily basic' - which is to say, they can be referred to as the explanation for other qualities or phenomena without requiring explanation themselves - and they are distinct in that our sensory experience of them resembles them in reality. (For example, one perceives an object as spherical precisely because of the way the atoms of the sphere are arranged.) Primary qualities cannot be removed by either thought or physical action, and include mass, movement, and, controversially, solidity (although later proponents of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities usually discount solidity). * Secondary qualities are qualities which one's experience does not directly resemble; for example, when one sees an object as red, the sensation of seeing redness is not produced by some quality of redness in the object, but by the arrangement of atoms on the surface of the object which reflects and absorbs light in a particular way. Secondary qualities include colour, smell, and taste. In contemporary philosophy, epistemological dualism has come under sustained attack by philosophers like Wittgenstein (the private language argument) and Wilfrid Sellars in his seminal essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Indirect realism is argued to be problematical because of Ryle's regress and the homunculus argument. However, recently reliance on the private language argument and the Homunculus Objection has itself come under attack. It can be argued that those who argue for 'inner presence', to use Antti Revonsuo's term,〔Revonsuo, Antti (2006) ''Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon,'' Cambridge MA: MIT Press.〕 are not proposing a private 'referent', with the application of language to it being 'private' and thus unshareable, but a ''private'' use of ''public'' language. There is no doubt that each of us has a private understanding of public language, a fact that has been experimentally proven;〔Rommetveit, Ragnar (1974) ''On Message Structure: A Framework for the Study of Language and Communication,'' London: John Wiley & Sons.〕 George Steiner refers to our personal use of language as an 'idiolect', one particular to ourselves in its detail.〔Steiner, George (1998), ''After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation,'' London & New York: Oxford University Press.〕 The question has to be put how a collective use of language can go on when, not only do we have differing understandings of the words we use, but our sensory registrations differ.〔Hardin, C. L. (1988) ''Color for Philosophers,'' Indianapolis IN: Hackett Pub. Co.〕 The reason for continued confusion is that "both direct and indirect realism are frankly incredible, although each is incredible for different reasons".〔 The direct realist view 〔Gibson, J. J. 'Outline of a theory of direct visual perception', In J. R. Royce & W. W. Rozeboom (eds.), The Psychology of Knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach, 1972.〕 is incredible because it suggests that we can have experience of objects out in the world directly, beyond the sensory surface, as if bypassing the chain of sensory processing. The pattern of electrochemical activity that corresponds to our conscious experience can take a form that reflects the properties of external objects, but our consciousness is necessarily confined to the experience of those internal effigies of external objects, rather than of external objects themselves. Unless the principle of direct perception can be demonstrated in a simple artificial sensory system, this explanation remains as mysterious as the property of consciousness it is supposed to explain.〔 But the indirect realist view is also incredible, for it suggests that the world that we perceive is merely a pattern of energy in the physical brain inside our head. This could only mean that the head we have come to know as our own is not our true physical head, but merely a miniature copy of it inside a copy of the world contained within our true physical skull. The external world and its phenomenal replica cannot be spatially superimposed, for one is inside your physical head, and the other is outside. The existential vertigo occasioned by this concept of perception is so disorienting that only a handful of researchers have seriously entertained this notion or pursued its implications to its logical conclusion. (Kant 1781/1991, Koffka 1935, Köhler 1971 p. 125, Russell 1927 pp 137–143, Smythies 1989, 1994, (current ), Harrison 1989, Hoffman 1998, Lehar (current ), Hameroff (current ))"〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Direct and indirect realism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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